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Abstract. Over the past five years, there has been considerable growth and es-
tablished value in the practice of modeling automotive software requirements.
Much of this growth has been centered on requirements of software associated
with the established functional areas of an automobile, such as those associated
with powertrain, chassis, body, safety and infotainment. This paper makes a case
for modeling four additional attributes that are increasingly important as vehicles
become information conduits: security, privacy, usability, and reliability. These
four attributes are important in creating specifications for embedded in-vehicle
automotive software.
This paper examines the automobile context of security, privacy, usability and
reliability (SPUR). In an automobile safety is paramount, and while leisure may
certainly be found in an automobile, compromising driver attention could mean
loss of life or serious injury and loss of productivity. All this makes the automo-
bile a very special case of information and physical mobility — as in the cases of
cellular phone based mobility, and mass transportation (bus, train, ship, airplane)
based mobility.
Several real-world use-cases are reviewed to illustrate both the consumer and
system needs associated with SPUR in the automobile and to highlight the asso-
ciated functional and non-functional requirements. From these requirements the
underlying architectural elements of automotive SPUR are also derived. Broadly
speaking these elements span three software service domains: the off-board en-
terprise software domain, the nomadic (device or service) software domain and
the embedded (in-vehicle) software domain all of which need to work in tandem
for the creation and complete lifecycle management of automotive software.
1 Introduction
The nature and terrain of computing in the automobile is in a state of transition. Au-
tomotive computing is transforming from being function-oriented to being service ori-
ented, while the terrain (or logical boundaries) of computing in an automobile is ex-
panding to include both computing elements in the wireless external infrastructure and
the nomadic (or hand held, mobile) infrastructure. This transition is being driven on the
one hand by consumers, wanting to keep pace with their changing life styles and, on
the other hand, by regulatory agencies placing more stringent demands on the attributes
such as safety, emissions, fuel economy. Given the transformation in the nature and ter-
rain of automotive computing, this paper makes the case for modeling security, privacy,
usability and reliability (SPUR) — motivated in part by David Patterson’s manifesto [1].
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For nearly a century, the automobile was defined by components with local func-
tionality and differentiated by proprietary systems engineering implementations involv-
ing mostly mechanical coupling between components. Over the past three decades, with
the advent of microelectronics and local-area networks [2] in the automobile, there has
been a steady growth in the use of mechatronics [3] and the practice of allocating func-
tions across multiple components. The applications of systems engineering principles,
in turn has been extended to heterogenous contexts of mixed mechanical, electronic,
digital, analog (or discrete-time, continuous-time) sub-systems and components. With
the growing maturity of the software eco-system [4] — operating systems, program-
ming languages, development environments, engineering tools, to name some key el-
ements — the modern automobile is being increasingly defined by software. There is
a trend to allocate automobile functions across multiple standardized components (to
reduce the number or unique hardware modules) and to use software design, modeling
and engineering for function implementation and associated product differentiation [5].
In this context, the automobile is rapidly becoming a distributed computing environ-
ment.
Commensurate with the growth in demand for new features — from both consumers
and regulatory agencies — is the increase in the complexity of functional allocation
across the distributed computing environment in the vehicle. In addition to the growth
in the complexity of functional allocation, the computing terrain of the automobile is
also rapidly changing [6]. With the advent of wireless personal, local, and wide-area
technologies, the physical boundary of the automobile is no longer the logical bounding
box for functional allocation. Functions may be distributed across on-board computing
units [5], off-board (such as roadside) infrastructure units [7] and nomadic devices [8]
such as cellular phones.
To manage this growth in the complexity of allocating functions, another level of
abstraction will likely be required to specify features enabled by electronics and soft-
ware. A service-oriented computing approach [9], is an attractive option. The present
day automobile is function-defined — most consumer perceived features are based on
the specification of distributed on-board functions; the future automobile will likely be
service-defined, with features being specified, modeled and synthesized by aggregating
consumer and vehicle related services from both on-board and off-board sources.
The next section (Section 2) of this paper elaborates the case for SPUR in the au-
tomotive context and outlines the role of modeling SPUR. Section 3 introduces two
broad examples that highlight the new computational terrain of the automobile and
the role of modeling SPUR in these contexts: one example shows how the computa-
tional terrain logically extends from the the physical boundaries of the automobile into
the roadside infrastructure and the second example illustrates how the new automo-
tive computational terrain extends through nomadic devices and services into the wide
area communication networks (such as the wireless telephony networks and, in general,
the wireless internet). Section 4 shows how SPUR attributes associated with a specific
use-case could be modeled. Section 5 lists requirements for tools needed to develop
SPUR models. Section 6, in conclusion, summarizes the need to model SPUR in the
automotive context.
2 SPUR in the Automotive Context
SPUR [1] was advocated on the premise of shifting research efforts in computer science
and engineering away from making faster, cheaper systems to making systems that
are more secure, privacy-preserving, usable, and reliable. The automotive industry is
particularly well-suited to understand the value of each aspect of SPUR-oriented design.
Security in the automotive domain has so far emphasized physical security. The
first automobiles were produced without any built-in theft deterrents. Gradually they
acquired keys to start the engine and door locks to protect property left in the vehicle.
Modern vehicles now use sophisticated radio transmission devices with strong cryptog-
raphy to prevent unauthorized entry.
Network connectivity is being added to vehicles through telematics services (e.g.,
OnStar, R© BMW ASSISTTM) and hands-free telephony, introducing the possibility of
remote intrusion into a vehicle’s embedded networks. Not only could a remote intrusion
compromise the physical security of the vehicle (i.e., unauthorized remote unlock), but
it could directly affect the vehicle’s drivability. For example, a virus could trigger the
vehicle’s theft alarm while driving. Clearly, as the automotive industry integrates more
digital network technology into vehicles, its impact on both physical and digital security
must be assessed.
On the flip-side of the security coin is a concern for privacy. Modern vehicles
“know” much more about their drivers and passengers than ever before. Vehicular nav-
igation systems could be used to correlate data and extract potentially private infor-
mation. For example, correlating driver location data with the locations of points of
interest such as stores, places of worship, community centers and other buildings an or-
ganization can build an accurate profile of the driver’s interests. The privacy concerns of
automobile customers must be treated seriously and safeguarded with the introduction
of new technologies such as telematics and navigation services.
The usability aspect of SPUR in the automotive context is especially important be-
cause of its impact on safety. An automobile’s human-machine interface (HMI) must
allow the driver to focus on the task of driving while at the same time providing un-
occluded access to driver information as well as comfort and convenience features such
as climate and radio controls. Complicating the matter are the integration of new tech-
nologies such as mobile phone services, voicemail, messaging, and email into the ve-
hicle HMI. A balance must be struck between the complexity of an HMI with many
features and safe usability.
Reliability has been a serious concern in the automotive industry and in the con-
suming public’s minds for some time now. Automobiles are increasingly becoming
software-driven, not just mechanically driven. Therefore, software reliability will be as
important as mechanical reliability in future automobiles.
Table 1 outlines automotive examples that exhibit varying combinations of SPUR
attributes. Each row categorizes examples as having or lacking some SPUR attributes.
For example, the Carfax R© web service allows anyone to view detailed maintenance
and accident histories of any vehicle for a fee. The service must be secure to prevent
unauthorized tampering with vehicle records, usable enough for anyone to understand,
and reliable to provide correct information.
Table 1. Examples illustrating SPUR in an automotive context and the relative impor-
tance (Low, Medium, High) of each SPUR attribute to each example.
Example S P U R
Carfax R© database H L H H
Anti-lock braking system M L H H
Door key H L M H
Valet key H H M L
License plate M L L L
The examples shown in Table 1 have software that resides either wholly inside the
vehicle, or entirely outside the vehicle. Conversely, software implementing sophisti-
cated telematics services reside not only on-board the vehicle but also off-board, in-
cluding the IT infrastructure of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), dealerships,
telecommunications operators, and in hand held consumer devices. Because of the new
push of automotive software across module and vehicular boundaries, there is a need
to develop models that cross these boundaries as well. Furthermore, because vehicular
telematics software relies on dynamic external software, models of telematics systems
must change along with deployed systems. A service-oriented approach to implement-
ing automotive software — both in-vehicle software as well as enterprise software —
eases the design, implementation and maintenance of systems to ensure that each re-
quirement of SPUR design is present in the system.
Figure 1 illustrates this interesting space. As we stated before, we believe it is im-
portant to understand how to model services that cross the embedded and enterprise
domains. Within this space are both functional and para-functional (or non-functional)
requirements. Functional requirements are more visible, however we believe that the
para-functional requirements will be increasingly important. In particular, we are in-
terested in understanding how the mobility inherent in a vehicle impacts this space.
Providing functionality to a person driving at highway speeds requires strong attention
to SPUR both at the human to machine interface as well as the machine to machine
interface. The safety and quality of the driving experience is clearly affected by these
attributes. At the same time, designing computer communications systems that support
SPUR concerns in these types of mobile applications requires careful attention to sys-
tem interactions.
3 Examples of Automotive Services
In this section we use two examples to demonstrate the trend towards automotive ser-
vices extending outside the physical constraints of the vehicle. The first is the Vehicle
Infrastructure Integration (VII) project [7]. The second is the Vehicle Consumer Ser-
vices Interface (VCSI) project [8]. These two examples demonstrate integration of the
vehicle with roadside infrastructure and consumer services respectively.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of automotive SPUR.
3.1 VII
The Vehicle Infrastructure Integration project is a joint effort involving the United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT), state transportation departments, and vehicle
manufactures. The VII goal is to develop and deploy the roadside and vehicular in-
frastructure needed to improve the safety of the nation’s roadways. By improving the
amount and types of information available from the roadway and by having improved
safety warnings and controls, drivers will be better prepared to mitigate or avoid acci-
dents. The features enabled by VII include everything from warning drivers that another
vehicle is about to run a red light, to notifying drivers that a given section of road is
covered with ice. Table 2 lists the titles assigned to some of the first scenarios being
considered. In addition, it highlights how important the SPUR attributes are to each
scenario. In general, scenarios that are likely to affect driver behavior or well-being
have a high impact from security. For example, an incorrect signal that an emergency
vehicle is approaching could cause great headaches to drivers, and potentially disrupt
the usage of this signal by true emergency vehicles. Thus, it’s important that such a sys-
tem be secure against malicious manipulation. On the other hand, spurious information
about traffic information is less likely to significantly impact drivers, hence it is listed
as having medium importance relative to security.1 Privacy is more of a concern when
revealing information about specific vehicles, as in the case of intersection warnings.
1 It’s important to note that we’re talking about a subjective measure of security for illustrative
purposes. We strongly believe that all of these attributes are important considerations for any
scenario.
On the other hand, road conditions are likely to be broadcast to everybody, and there-
fore unlikely to contain a significant privacy risk. In general, useability and reliability
are significant to all of these scenarios. In some cases, usability is less important, since
the consequences are less severe.
Table 2. List of VII use cases and the relative importance (Low, Medium, High) of each
SPUR attribute to each use case.
Use case S P U R
Emergency Brake Warning M L H H
Curve Speed Warning M L H H
Traffic Signal Violation Warning H M H H
Stop Sign Violation Warning H M H H
Emergency Vehicle Approaching H L H H
In-Vehicle Signage M L M M
Traffic Information and alt route guidance M L M H
Electronic payments H H M H
Roadway Condition Information M L H H
Traffic Management H L H H
Emergency Vehicle At Scene H L H H
3.2 VCSI
The second project, the Vehicle Consumer Services Interface (VCSI), is a project at
Ford to provide an interface between consumers, their personal devices, off-board ser-
vices, and vehicle systems including both networks and devices. To demonstrate this
system, we developed a prototype vehicle that contained several specific applications
including those shown in Figure 3. As with the VII examples above, we’ve made some
attempt to demonstrate the relative importance of each SPUR attribute to each service.
Since most of the consumer facing services provided by VCSI are not safety critical,
they have lower requirements on usability and reliability. At the same time, most of
these services depend on interfacing with devices that have personal information. In
that context, it’s important that the privacy of the data contained within those devices
be kept secure.
Overall, we think these two projects demonstrate an increasing trend towards in-
creased connectivity with a vehicle, both from consumer devices and from roadside
infrastructure. In addition, we believe that modeling provides the means to understand
these services provided to the consumer at a system level.
4 Electronic Payment Use Case
In this section, we present a more in-depth look at the electronic payment use case
mentioned in Section 3 and how it relates to SPUR-oriented design. With electronic
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Fig. 2. A sequence diagram showing the interactions between entities in a parking
garage with an electronic payment service. In this scenario a driver parks her car in
a smart parking garage and electronically pays upon exit.
Table 3. List of VCSI services and the relative importance (Low, Medium, High) of
each SPUR attribute to each service.
Service S P U R
Vehicle Personalization L H M H
Personal Information Management H H M M
MyHome (Home Automation Services) H H M M
Bluetooth Technology H H M M
Real-time navigation M L M H
Diagnostics H M H H
In-vehicle media player M M M M
payments, drivers will have the ability to pay for parking electronically without inter-
acting with a parking meter or a garage attendant. Drivers will no longer have to dig
around for spare change and municipalities will no longer have to collect cash from
parking meters.
Figure 2 shows a sequence diagram for a vehicle involved in an electronic payment
scenario with a parking garage. The main entities in the diagram are the driver of the
vehicle, the vehicle’s software systems (implemented in a service-oriented architecture,
as shown in Figure 3), the vehicle’s OEM (or a delegate of the OEM), and the parking
garage authority. When the vehicle enters the garage, the garage transmits a list of
services and their costs to the vehicle, which in turn presents this information to the
driver through the vehicle’s HMI.
Vehicle  Service Set
Cryptographic
Authentication
Service
HMI
Service
Secure Data
Store Service
Network
Transport
Service
Telematics
Services
Fig. 3. The vehicle services needed to implement electronic payment in a service-
oriented architecture.
Assuming that the driver is willing to pay the cost to park, she acknowledges the cost
of service, parks the vehicle and leaves. The vehicle sends a signed acknowledgement
to the garage. Later, the driver returns and begins driving out of the garage. The garage
calculates the amount of money owed and securely transmits a bill to the vehicle. The
vehicle notifies the driver of how much is owed through the HMI and requests that the
driver consent to pay. Confirmation from the driver causes the vehicle to transmit an
encrypted, signed payment authorization message to the OEM. The OEM, acting in
the role of an e-payment service, securely credits the funds to the parking garage and
returns a signed receipt to the vehicle showing proof of payment. Finally, the garage
sends a signed receipt to the vehicle showing that it has received its requested payment.
Thus, at the end of the interaction between the driver and the garage, the driver
has proof from both the OEM and the garage that she has paid what she owed. The
garage has a signed acknowledgement from the driver stating that she understood the
cost to park before she parked her vehicle as well as funds deposited by the OEM to
pay for parking. The receipts returned to the driver are necessary to prove that she
paid for services in the case of a dispute between the garage and driver. Similarly, the
signed acknowledgement agreeing to the cost of parking from the driver is necessary to
dissuade a driver from reneging on payment upon exit from the garage.
4.1 Challenges
There are many challenges involving SPUR in the context of such an automotive e-
payment system. While many of these challenges are not unique to e-payments in gen-
eral, the scope of this paper is to understand how these issues are unique in an automo-
tive context.
First are questions of infrastructure. E-payments require a secure, potentially pri-
vate, system for transferring money from a driver or other occupant in the car to a
specific payee. We also assume that these payments will reflect current cash payment
characteristics, specifically, we need to support individual transactions of less than one
dollar. This requires the support of a third party to aggregate payments on both sides of
the payment. This could be the vehicle manufacture, as we’ve outlined before, a credit
card issuer, or an Internet e-payment provider.
Automotive e-payment is inherently a mobile application. Malicious agents are
likely to have easy access to all communication that takes place outside the vehicle.
In addition, unlike personal mobile devices such as a cell phone, there is inherently less
physical security over the vehicle. Cars are often parked in public spaces, and routinely
in control of mechanics. Even users sometime have a vested interest in modifying the
vehicle software, as evidenced by powertrain modification chips. These reasons imply
that some type of end-to-end assurance is needed about the legitimacy of each individ-
ual transaction. However, there is an inherent trade-off between the sophistication of a
given security system and the risk of compromise. For example, an individual driver is
unlikely to notice or care if a individual penny or quarter is missing from his car when
she takes it in for service. Similarly, users often trade off convenience for increased risk
of monetary loss. For example, many electronic cash cards such as the Octopus card
used in Hong Kong [10] require no authentication to use, and the owner assumes that a
lost card implies the money associated with that card is also lost. Similarly, in-vehicle
e-payment systems need to take into account the unique environment when trading off
risk with cost. Mobility also has implications for the reliability of the system. There is
no guarantee that a device will always stay in communications range during the period
of a transaction.
Providing security and privacy in electronic transactions naturally implies the use of
cryptographic protocols. In contrast to general purpose computers, the computational
power and upgrade capabilities of embedded devices is severely limited. In addition,
unlike the consumer electronics side of the embedded, mobile marketplace, vehicle
software has a useful life of over ten years. In this context, how do we ensure that the
computational power will be great enough to support key lengths that can’t be easily
compromised long into the future, without needless expense? At the same time, flaws
in cryptographic protocols are not uncommon, so the in-vehicle software should be
upgradable, without causing undue burden on the driver.
Second, are questions of authentication. How do we authenticate that the person
responsible for the account used in the transaction is authorized to make the payment?
We can’t always assume that the driver is authorized to make payments with an account
associated with the vehicle. Valets or even teenage drivers quickly complicate this as-
sumption. At the same time, we want to authenticate the payee to the driver, making
sure that a hacker hasn’t set up their own virtual toll booth at the side of the highway,
while still making it easy for small businesses to use the system. In some sense, the
physical nature of our scenario provides opportunities not usually seen on the Inter-
net. Most drivers require a physical or electronic key in order to enter a vehicle. At the
same time, in the scenarios that we described, the payee will be in physical view of
the driver. This presents an opportunity to provide out-of-band signaling to facilitate
authentication.
Similarly, the physical nature of owning a vehicle presents an opportunity for asso-
ciating real people with digital identities. In buying or leasing a vehicle, most buyers
have little expectation of privacy. Most transactions require some type of financing,
necessitating at least a credit check. Even in situations where this isn’t the case (e.g.
person to person cash transactions), owning a vehicle requires licensing with the state,
another transaction which implies a lack of privacy, and a financial interest in correctly
identifying the owner.
Finally, the interface between the driver and the vehicle computer system poses
several important challenges. Because we are talking about the driver authorizing pay-
ments while driving, this interaction needs to require little attention from the driver. At
the same time, we need drivers to understand the security implications of the actions
they’re performing. Studies of web browser security have demonstrated techniques to
better inform users of the security implications of the current browser state [11].
5 Modeling Requirements
The electronic payment use case detailed in Section 4 touches on all aspects of SPUR-
oriented design. For vehicular electronic payment to be widely accepted, sensitive fi-
nancial information must be securely exchanged between the vehicle, the OEM, and a
service vendor. The privacy of financial dealings must also be preserved. Furthermore,
the HMI must clearly present information about the cost of a service and indicate when
consent is required. Finally, electronic payment systems must be reliable enough to give
drivers the confidence to wholly adopt them.
Modeling the parking garage use case requires a diverse set of tools and disciplines.
The driver must not be distracted while making financial transactions yet the HMI must
be involving enough to assure the driver that they are making a secure transaction. The
HMI may use a text display, an LCD, voice recognition, or a combination of interface
technologies to communicate with the driver. We must be able to realistically model a
user interface with all of these qualities.
A significant amount of software of varying complexity is involved in our use case,
from less complex programs embedded in the vehicle to highly complex back-end soft-
ware at the OEM and parking garage vendor. The interactions between the vehicle, the
OEM, and the service vendor must be modeled as well. We thus require a software mod-
eling tool that can effectively model heterogeneous software environments with varying
levels of complexity.
Each aspect of SPUR is a whole-system attribute. For example, spending resources
on creating a security-hardened implementation of the vehicle’s embedded programs
is useless if the communications between the vehicle and OEM are unencrypted. Sim-
ilarly, an electronic payment system with a highly reliable embedded program but a
buggy OEM back-end interface makes the system as a whole unreliable.
Therefore, to fully evaluate each aspect of SPUR we must be able to study the HMI
of the vehicle, its embedded programs, the OEM and parking garage enterprise software
as a single system. We require a single tool or suite of tools that can fully inter-operate
in order to model the interactions between each of the system’s components. The tool
must allow us to inject faults or directed attacks and measure the effects both in terms
of software metrics (i.e. loss of privacy, reduced reliability) and in terms of customer-
facing metrics such as the effect of a fault at the OEM on the in-vehicle HMI.
6 Conclusion
Given the transformation that both the nature and terrain of computing in the automobile
are undergoing, this paper has outlined the case to model security, privacy, usability
and reliability (SPUR) in the context of the software enabled services associated with
the automobile. SPUR represents a set of attributes that are not explicitly articulated
or demanded by the end customer or consumer and hence, broadly speaking, SPUR
represents non-functional, or para-functional, attributes.
Security, privacy, usability and reliability have all been product creation require-
ments that have been well understood and refined by the automotive industry over the
years, but almost exclusively in the mechanical or physical context. With the advent of
the information-enabled automobile — connected to the roadside infrastructure and to
consumer devices — SPUR takes on a very different interpretation. This paper high-
lights the importance of SPUR. In addition, we make a case for modeling SPUR, as this
would avoid costly and time consuming hardware investments and will likely provide
quick insights into how technologies and standards could be adapted to meet automotive
SPUR requirements.
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